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'T. C. MITS' and the Utility of Science 
ABSTRACT - The general public, as well as many leaders of our society tend to view science as 
descriptive and to value science mainly for "practical" applications. Although technological implica-
tions are important, science cannot legitimately be considered primarily descriptive. Science is a 
creative activity, involving human judgment, and can most fruitfully be thought of as metaphor or 
play. The practical value of science, of the liberal arts in general, and of academe is that they provide 
the playful approach to experience which is a necessary basis for successful planning and action, and 
which makes us human. 
EVAN B. HAZARD* 
When a college opens a new science building, it proudly 
invites T. C. Mits in for a look. I first learned of T. C. Mits as 
an acronym for The Common Man In The Street in Simon 
( 1973). (I have since found that his liberated companion, 
T. C. Wits, prefers to retain her maiden name. She has, how-
ever, graciously assented to my use of masculine pronouns 
and acronyms in a generic sense.) Having T . C. Milson campus 
to look at us provides me an excuse for a look at what we are 
doing in academe, using aquatic biology as a start, but going 
on to the natural sciences in general, and then to the other 
liberal arts. I will be selective, and will emphasize certain 
basic aspects of our calling which are generally neglected or 
belittled outside of academe, and which it has lately become 
fashionable to neglect within academe as well. 
What might T. C. Mits see college faculty and students 
studying in aquatic biology and related environmental studies? 
Faculty and students are following the movements of wall-
eyes with radio-tracking equipment, studying the growth 
rates of known year-classes of perch, developing new methods 
of determining the age of walleyes, analyzing well water to 
determine its usability, measuring the concentration of mer-
cury and other heavy metals in game fishes, studying the 
effects on stream water quality of the fertilization of com-
mercial wild rice paddies, evaluating the influence of snow-
mobiles on vegetation and wildlife, and so on. 
These are important activities, deliberately described in 
terms that perhaps first come to the mind ofT. C. Mits when 
he is thinking favorable thoughts about the sciences. Perhaps 
his feelings and those of many businessmen, legislators, and 
government officials, as well as of some academicians, can be 
summed up in the following widely quoted words: 
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'The most important problem does not lie in under-
standing the laws of the objective world and thus being 
able to explain it, but in applying the knowledge of 
these laws." 
Some ways of applying knowledge are too obvious. As 
soon as the radio-tracking studies were publicized, we began 
to receive calls asking where the fish were. On a somewhat 
higher plane, knowledge that we gain in limnology, bio-
chemistry, physiology, heavy metals research, and so on may 
be of real long term practical benefit. We may learn more 
about the movement of walleyes, and thus about the best 
ways in which to manage walleye populations for sustained 
yield harvesting. We may learn how to avoid eating excess 
methyl mercury in contaminated fish, or better still, how to 
reduce the contamination. And, in carrying out such studies, 
students acquire the facts and the skills to be of service to 
society in solving such problems elsewhere, and in teaching 
others the scientific approach to answering questions. 
The practical application of science is important, and I 
wish in no way to belittle it. However, as I have described 
it, it is as much technology as it is basic science. Without 
being too analytical, perhaps we can consider technology as a 
collection of methods for getting jobs done, and science as a 
system of rules and behavior patterns for trying to explain 
observations within a certain rational context, for making 
rational sense out of the universe. The two are today often 
closely related, but this is not a logical necessity. If there 
were no deliberate attempt to do science, there would still be 
technology. Damascus steel was forged with no understanding 
of modern chemistry, medieval armies catapulted projectiles 
into walled cities with no knowledge of dynamics, Luther 
Burbank bred super vegetables without understanding genet-
ics; and although we have known of Newton's law of gravita-
tion for almost 300 years, we still make no use of it in pre-
dicting tides over IO years in Coos Bay, Oregon. 
Scientific understanding often makes technology develop 
faster, but in principle and often in practice, you can operate 
effectively without knowing what you are doing. And society 
primarily values science for its technological usefulness, not 
for its exploratory value. In fact, T . C. Mits would often 
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rather not understand. I think we should keep this in mind 
when we think about society's support for science. Many 
people believe that American society supported basic science 
heavily in the 1960's. Actually, "the fact is that it never 
supported basic science on a large scale - as basic science" 
(Simon, 1973) . Most nations support the sciences primarily 
in hopes of solving technical problems - in health, military 
capacity, space exploration, energy development, and so on . 
In the last few years, as budgets have gotten tighter, the 
emphasis on short-term, supposedly practical, results has 
increased. Purse-string holders have become more reluctant 
to realize that , in the long run, basic science done solely for 
its explanatory value will also produce information of poten-
tial practical benefit. Most of us could cite many examples to 
prove that this is true , but it would be pointless. As Edward 
Edelson, science editor for the New York Daily News, points 
out, "the very attempt is a mistake. You cannot justify 
science on practical grounds any more than you can justify 
music or art or literature. ff you must start pleading practical 
benefits - that the symphony increases productivity or that 
painting is good interior decorating or that the novel uplifts 
morals - you have lost the argument before it begins" 
(Edelson, 1974). Therefore, despite the fact that the applica-
tion of science is where the money comes from, let us dwell 
on the nature of basic science, partly because it is more fun, 
but also because it will take us full circle. 
Alternative approaches 
First, some ground rules. Scientists, insofar as they are 
effective scientists, are rational. They of course have no 
monopoly on reason, nor are they reasonable in all things. 
But they believe that, in order to understand their observa-
tions, they must reason. Linnaeus ( 1758) said "it is the ex-
clusive property of man to contemplate and to reason on the 
great book of nature . She gradually unfolds herself to him 
who, with patience and perseverance, will search into her 
mysteries." (We will ignore any male supremacist implica-
tions at this time. Ou !side of his scientific endeavors, Linnaeus 
was as capable of unreason as the next person.) This ground 
rule is an article of faith . So is a second ground rule : "the 
universe is orderly." (Neither of these articles of faith rules 
out other sorts of faith among scientists.) There is no logical 
necessity that the universe be orderly. Even if it is, there isno 
assurance that people are capable of fully understanding the 
order that is there. But scientists think the universe is orderly, 
and in principle comprehensible, largely because this approach 
is so fruitful. The success of the scientific approach to the 
study of things has them pretty much convinced that the 
universe is all of a piece. Most of them find this exciting and 
awe-inspiring. The apparent orderliness of the universe in 
fact moved Einstein to observe that "the most incomprehen-
sible fact is that nature is comprehensible" (Weisskopf, I 972). 
Many people, including most scientists, see the order in the 
universe and the potential ability of man to understand it as 
a good thing. Others do not see it that way at all. 
In order to consider a few of the reasons why some people 
find basic science congenial and some people do not, we 
should look carefully at the nature of scientific understand-
ing. T. C. Mils thinks science is basically a collection of in-
fonnation about nature, a description of the universe. Most 
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college professors outside the sciences probably agree with 
him, and so do some scientists. These people see science as 
objective, which it is, and also as automatic, which it is not. 
They thin,k that the scientist carefully collects measurable 
data, divides the sum by pi times the natural logarithm of 
Avogadro's number, and mechanically produces a description 
of that part of the universe from which the data were gathered . 
The more data, and the more precise the measurement , the 
better the description. It is understandable that some people, 
seeing scientists as cataloguers and calculators, find science 
unattractive . Wordsworth ( 1800), al though he does not use 
the word science, is obviously talking about us when he 
writes: 
"Physician art thou? one all eyes, 
Philosopher! a fingering slave, 
One that would peep and botanize 
Upon his mother's grave?" 
This view of science, as a description of nature, is un-
attractive because science then seems to be devoid of human 
judgment. But, as many of us see it, this mechanical view of 
science is false (Bronowski, 1965; Miller, 1970). I say this 
for two reasons. The first is that a completely mechanical 
description is as impossible (and would be as useless) in 
science as it is in painting or poetry. Cezanne and Wyeth 
both decide what to include in a painting and how to include 
it, and even Canaletto chooses his colors and his composition. 
Ansel Adams chooses his composition, perspective, lighting, 
and exposure. Are the known "facts" of science automatic 
descriptions? Hardly. Nobody has ever watched Mars do a 
full turn around the sun; aJJ we have is a series of points on 
charts. Kepler 's conclusion that the orbit of Mars is an ellipse 
is a human judgment. The points on the charts do not simply 
generate an ellipse - they can be made to fit other curves , 
and they do not fit an ellipse exactly. Johannes Kepler and 
his successors have had to make judgments about observa-
tional errors and the disturbing effects of other planets in 
order to conclude that Mars, and by inference all the other 
planets, travel in ellipses. Or, rather, that they would if the 
other bodies were not there. But they are there. Yet we, 
reasonably, still persist in saying that Mars travels in an ellipse 
about the sun. 
The same process occurs in biology, and all the sciences. 
Gregor Mendel, in the second generation of his fifth experi-
ment with garden peas , obtained 428 plants with green pods 
and 152 plants with yellow pods (Hardin, 1966). This is not 
a 3 : 1 ratio, but a 2.82: I ratio. (Three significant figures is 
enough to make my point.) In Mendel's judgment, this and 
similar experiments, none of which gave exactly a 3: I ratio, 
justified the statement that a certain set of conditions results 
in a 3: I ratio. The 3: I Mendelian ratio is not a description of 
nature, but a judgment about what is important in nature and 
what is not. It has meaning, whereas the mere data do not. 
And even the mere data themselves are a judgment, because 
Mendel decided that for a particular chosen purpose, it was 
best to ignore those plants that died, any insignificant differ-
ences in the greenness of green pods, the time of flowering, 
and what not. Decided, chosen, purpose, best, insignificant 
are not neutral, mechanical words . There are differences be-
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tween the sciences and the arts, but absence of personal 
judgment is not one of them. 
Science as metaphor 
The second reason that science cannot legitimately be 
seen as mechanical description goes deeper. Klopfer (1974) 
argues that the objectives of the sciences, the arts, literature, 
philosophy, and theology are basically the same , "to find 
new ways of perceiving the universe ." (Note: He did not say 
the methods were indistinguishable .) Let us now look at what 
some non-scientists think about their way of perception . 
John Ciardi, a poet, had this to say in 1964: 
"I do not deal in ideas but in experiences. I must make 
illusions for you. I must make something happen, and 
it must be as if it is happening to you. Every as if ex-
perience you try on is another way of seeing yourselves. 
I must lead you to feel as if you were a child , a lover, 
a murderer , a dancer, a coward . For only as you try on 
all your possibilities vicariously can you come to know 
yourself. 
" But you will not be able to try them on if I only 
tell you about them .... I must make you feel them 
as if they were happening to you. And to do that, f 
must play my games. 
"I am not even sure .... that I play my games for 
you at all. I th ink l would play them if I were the last 
man alive. If I am in any way your benefactor, the 
benefaction is an accident. I play the games that let me 
write poems because [ find that writing the poem is a 
better way of living than not writing it. Because I an1 
happiest when I find myself winning a hard game with 
myself" (Ciardi , 1954). 
The poet uses metaphor to evoke images, to convey mean-
ing. He plays with words . Theologians also are interested in 
finding meaning in experience. Some , like Frederick Buechner 
( 1973) and David Miller ( 1970), find in play the route to 
greater understanding in theology . To Buechner the Lord's 
Supper is deeply meaningful , yet he says this of it: "It is 
make believe . . .. It is a game you play because he said to 
play it. 'Do this in remembrance of me.' Do this. Play that it 
makes a difference . Play that it makes sense . If it seems a 
childish thing to do, do it in remembrance that you are a 
child ." Miller devotes his book Gods and Games to the devel-
opment of a theology of metaphor, of "as if," of play. And 
he reminds us that this view of the Kingdom is not a new 
one: "Unless you receive the kingdom of God like a child, 
you cannot enter into it." (This is Miller's wording , and is 
presumably either Mark 10: IS or the comparable passage in 
Luke. It is not the wording of either KJ or RSV.) 
But, one might ask, what has this to do with science? The 
answer is everything. The profound insights of science are 
metaphor - "as if' - let's pretend." Any abstraction is pre-
tense, and the scientist must abstract in order to understand . 
The scientist is a model buil.der. The physicist does not con-
sider his atom with its electron clouds as reality , but as a 
fruitful picture of reality. The uniform rectilinear motion of 
Newton cannot occur in the real world, but it is the basis for 
a theory that , within limits, successfully relates the motions 
of apples, moons, space probes, and even comet Kohoutek . 
(Comet Kohoutek may not have been as bright as we would 
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like, but neither are we . But it followed precisely the pre-
dicted path, and it will be back. Just wait.) This theory, by 
the way, says objects behave "as if' there were an attractive 
force proportional to their masses and inversely proportional 
to the square of the distance between them, and which allows 
you to calculate "as if' the entire mass of a body were lo-
cated at the center of the body, which of course it is not. 
The entire science of population genetics is likewise based 
on a principle , the Hardy-Weinberg Law, which only holds 
true under conditions that never occur in nature. But this 
playing around allows us to predict the way real populations 
will behave with the passage of time . And these predictions 
come true, as anyone knows who has tried to kill flies with 
DDT in recent years. It turns out that the most informative 
way to express what happens in the genetics of populations 
is in terms of abstractions or metaphors, not raw facts . The 
population geneticist will thus happily state with a straight 
face that the gene pool of a Mendelian population of house-
flies has deviated from a Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium because 
an alteration in the ecosystem has changed the set-point . The 
housefly, being less interested in abstractions, is happy if it 
can deviate from the path of a flyswatter. 
I have said that the insights of science , like those of the 
arts and humanities, are basically metaphor , or model-build-
ing, and are thus in essence playful. In our work-oriented 
society, I fear most people would equate playful with "trivial ." 
Quite the opposite - play is essential. As the psychologist 
Erik Erikson (1963) has put it , "child's play is the infantile 
fonn of the human ability to deal with experience by creating 
model situations and to master reality by experiment and 
planning.'' The playful, metaphorical approach to experience , 
then , is the creative, uniquely human approach, and it is 
basically the same in the poet's retreat, the artist's studio, 
and the chemist 's laboratory. And this is what, to my old-
fashioned way of thinking, a college, and the liberal arts, are 
al l about. In the words of Miller ( 1970), "the university is 
where the action is not ; it is where the imagination is - the 
imagination for all action. Or so we would hope! It is the 
playground of ideas of play . And such play is serious business! 
It is the basis for whatever and wherever the action is." 
The utility of science 
And it is David Miller, of course, who has brought us full 
circle. It is the impractical , seriously playful pursuit of the 
sciences, the arts, and the humanities for their own sake which 
can give us the understanding which can be the only sound 
basis for responsible action in the everyday world of T. C. 
Mits. And it is imperative that T . C. Mils understand that 
world if he is to survive in it and prosper in it. It is not 
enough that the scientist understand ; T. C. Mits must under-
stand, too . If he understands nature , he may love her. If he 
does not , he will use her and such use, of course , is mis-use. 
Misuse is rape, and can only lead to ruin, both of nature and 
of T . C. Mits. Speaking of the defense of nature, Sigurd Olson 
once said (in an address on our campus) "only if there is 
understanding can there be reverence, and only where there 
is deep emotional feeling is anyone willing to do battle." 
T. C. Mits will not defend what he does not comprehend. 
One reason that T. C. Mits and his leaders often do not 
trust the arts and sciences, and are therefore suspicious of a 
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liberal education, is that they do not want to understand. 
Understanding is heady stuff - it is risky and frightening . It 
often shows us that the usual way of doing things is short-
sighted and even absurd. Because of this, T. C. Mits would 
often rather restrict the writer and musician to the production 
of TV commercials, and the scientist to the designing of 
better fish finders. 
What we consider practical, in the end, depends on how 
we view man. If we think that all T. C. Mils needs is a full 
belly and a dry basement, the liberal arts are unnecessary and 
even dangerous. But these are not all he needs. To be fully 
human, he needs to participate in that playful, metaphorical 
understanding of himself and his world of which only humans 
are capable. This means he needs a liberal education in the 
sciences, the arts, and the humanities. Society must support 
the impractical liberal arts for the very practical reason that 
they serve uniquely human needs. Chairman Mao Tse-Tung 
was therefore being impractical in I 972 when he said: 
"Marxist philosophy holds that the most important 
problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the 
objective world and thus being able to explain it, but 
in applying the knowledge of these laws actively to 
change the world." 
He, as well as others who adhere to any of the several 
existing rigid ideologies, might have added that a knowledge 
of the laws of the objective world might lead to the overthrow 
of the ideology itself, which is not the kind of change he had 
in mind . 
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